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When a man has finally reached the point where he does not think he
knows it better than others, that is when he has become indifferent to
what they have done badly and he is interested only in what they
have done right, then peace and affirmation have come to him.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Stanley Fish provoked a considerable reaction by publishing a law
review article that suggested that "theory" (by which he seemed to mean
much of what is published by other people in law reviews) has no conse-
* Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful to my student Susan
Ortmeyer for her help in preparing this paper.
1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, handwritten note preserved at Widener Library at
Harvard, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1954). Though less catchy than some
of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's other aphorisms, this note expresses the stance toward the
work of others (even Hegel) which everyone ought to aspire. That it remains only an aspiration
for many of us is demonstrated by the limitations of this Essay.
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quences.2 By virtue of the reaction, Fish thus proved in practice what
his article denied in metatheory: metatheory does have consequences,
but only if one includes the reaction of academics (perhaps we should
call these metaconsequences). This seems overbroad. Legal academic
discourse sometimes escapes the confines of academia, but only rarely.
This Essay describes one view of the possible consequences of the
theoretical work produced in law schools, particularly work that is
intended to be relevant to poverty law practice. I first describe a context
in which some advocates confront certain decisions and describe three of
many possible theories that might help inform their decisions. I next
describe a view of "theory" from the perspective of cognitive science,
which casts light on how practitioners incorporate theory of all sorts into
their cognitive apparatus. I then discuss two recent currents in scholar-
ship about poverty law practice: postmodem critical scholarship that
uses and emphasizes client narratives and a much smaller body of work
by clinical scholars and practitioners growing out of the Interuniversity
Poverty Law Consortium.4 Finally, I suggest some ways in which this
"new poverty law scholarship" might be reconstructed so as to be of
greater use to practice.
As I shall try to explain more directly later, all talk of theory needs
a context. This is mine.
2. See generally Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Use of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987). What Fish said he meant by theory was:
[A]n abstract or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice from a
position outside any particular conception of practice. A theory, in short, is
something a practitioner consults when he wishes to perform correctly, with the
term "correctly" here understood as meaning independently of his preconceptions,
biases, or personal preferences.
Id. at 1779.
I will not burden this paper with reference to all of the law review articles that Fish provoked.
The LEXIS LAWREV library reports 41 articles that cite Fish's piece. Of those I have read, I find
most appealing that of Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 SrAN. L. REv.
639 (1990), both for its "bait and cut" approach to Fish, and because Winter is one of the few legal
scholars who seems to share my enthusiasm for the utility of the cognitive paradigm in law.
3. C.f Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok. Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 HARv. L. REv. 926, 932 (1990). There is in legal academic discourse a substantial body of
scholarship about scholarship. I will not add to the infinitely recursive possibilities in this trend
anything beyond this footnote and a reference to Lasson, supra, at 932 n.35 (1990). Lasson shares
my contempt for unnecessary and self-referential footnotes.
4. Under sponsorship by the Ford Foundation, and intitially organized by legal scholars at
the law schools at Harvard, Wisconsin, and UCLA, the Consortium brought together law school
teachers from many different schools to reexamine ways in which law schools might contribute to
work at ending or ameliorating poverty. For a description of the Consortium, see 42 WASH U. J.
OF URB. AND CONTEMP. LAW 57 (1992). The papers there collected describe some of the
activities undertaken at various law schools as part of the Consortium.
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II. A CONTEXT: How "THE CAMPS" CAME TO AMERICAN CITIES
By the middle 1980s, many thousands of poor people, most of them
people of color, lived on sidewalks, under bridges, in vacant lots, in
makeshift scavenged shelters of cardboard, plastic, and the other detritus
of American cities. 5 The responses of local governments varied in some
ways, but were primarily similar. After a modest nod of concern and a
bit of charity had failed to make homeless people disappear, the local
ruling elites turned from social services to concerted police action.
6
Sometimes lawyers, including myself, got involved. In Los Angeles in
1987, poverty lawyers temporarily frustrated the efforts of Police Chief
Darryl Gates to lead mass arrests of homeless people in the sidewalk
encampments of skid row by obtaining a restraining order.7 In 1992, a
federal judge found that Miami had "a pattern and practice of arresting
homeless people for the purpose of driving them from public areas" and
entered a limited injunction.8
In both Miami and Los Angeles, what seemed like limited legal
victories began to evolve in odd and ominous ways. Although the dis-
trict court in Miami found that the City had a policy and practice of
systematically violating the 4th, 8th, and 14th Amendment rights of
homeless people, the court did not simply enjoin the unconstitutional
practices. Rather, the trial judge ordered the parties to agree on two
"safe zones," limited areas where homeless people might have their
5. Katherine Bishop, Tent Cities Becoming the Front Lines, N.Y.Timvs, Sept. 11, 1989, at
A14. The local history of homeless encampments and street dweling in some cities can also be
read or inferred in court decisions that eventually resulted from the legal controversies the
encampments created, most recently: Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F.Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash.
1994); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F.Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Johnson v.
City of Dallas, No. 3:94-CV-991-X, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11723 (N.D. Texas Aug. 18, 1994);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded, 40 F.3d 1155 (1 1th Cir.
1994); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
6. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of
Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TuL. L. Rav. 631, 646-47
(1992); NATIONAL LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: A REPORT
ANALYZING LOCAL ANTI-HOMELESS ORDINANCES 1 (1991).
7. Temporary Restraining Order, Bennion v. City of Los Angeles, No. C637718 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Feb. 25, 1987). The restraining order did not stop police "sweeps" directly. Id.
Rather, by requiring the police to give 12 hours notice before destroying encampments, it allowed
homeless people to maintain their encampments by moving them from one side of the street to the
other. In compliance with Section II of the "Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in
the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities" adopted by the Executive
Committee of the Association of American Law Schools, I note that I was one of the counsel for
plaintiffs in this action.
8. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded, 40 F.3d
1155 (11th Cir. 1995). As a member of the Board of the National Coalition for the Homeless, I
am involved as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs in the pending appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit.
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rights, free of random police harassment.9
Lawyers in Los Angeles did not perceive the Miami decision as a
victory, for reasons of their own local experience. The trial judge in the
1987 Los Angeles case refused to completely enjoin police "sweeps" of
the street camps, imposing instead only notice requirements. To deal
with the public relations problems posed by the continuing sweeps, the
city defined twelve acres of vacant land in the industrial bowels of the
City as an "urban campground." The street camps were then bulldozed
and the homeless effectively driven by the police into the urban camp-
ground. There, behind high steel fences, on the bare blowing dirt of the
city's land, soon lived 900 homeless people, nearly all of them African-
American or Latino, including many children. The Salvation Army pro-
vided a soup kitchen and bathrooms. Individuals donated some tents
and brightly colored party awnings to provide protection from the hot
summer sun. The city called it the "urban campground". My clients
who lived there called it many other things: Camp Dirt, Bradleyville,' °
and Soweto, USA." Even though it was isolated in the industrial ware-
house district of Los Angeles, next to the dry concrete of the Los Ange-
les River, there were nonetheless calls to move the camp further away,
perhaps to the local mountains"2 or to the California desert.
In looking for some way to force the city to improve the conditions
at the urban campground, I found nothing in the housing codes (since
there was no housing). I did, however, find some points of reference in
a document setting forth minimal standards for human habitation in a
campground setting: the War Department's regulations governing the
internment camp for Japanese-Americans at Manzanar. The urban
campground was itself bulldozed some months later, not in response to
any advocacy or legal effort, but to make room for the Los Angeles
subway construction project. This dismal experiment thus came to an
end. However, for the many who spent time there, the experience lives
on all too vividly. The urban campground was not Manzanar, and cer-
tainly not a concentration camp.' 3 It did not, however, require much
9. Id. at 1584.
10. After Mayor Tom Bradley. Discovery in the Bennion case, which was later made public,
revealed that Mayor Bradley was responsible for the initial effort to drive the street camps from
skid row.
11. This information is based upon my personal observations during many days spent at the
Urban Campground. I have previously described these observations in Gary Blasi & James Preis,
Litigation on Behalf of the Homeless, in HOMEaLESSNESS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIvE (Marjorie J.
Robertson & Milton Greenblatt, eds., 1992).
12. Councilman Gilbert Lindsay was quoted: "My sympathy is running out... I'm not
sympathetic to the 'y'all come.' Put them up in the Santa Monica mountains. That would be a
beautiful place for them."
13. I accompanied a rabbi friend and two survivors of the Nazi death camps to the urban
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imagination to see how we could get from the urban campground to
something much more horrible.
A proposal is now before the planning authorities of the City of Los
Angeles to make such "urban campgrounds" a permanent feature of Los
Angeles life.' 4 Under contract to the city's Community Redevelopment
Agency, two social scientists from the University of Southern California
(USC) conducted a study of the present street camps15 and proposed that
the city create several "24-hour camp/parks" with showers, lockers,
cooking pits, and toilets. This recommendation was based in part on
interviews with homeless people, who were asked if they would prefer
such a place to their current circumstances-which typically consist of a
makeshift cardboard and plastic shelter, an occasional barrel fire, and the
sporadic harassment of the police. Notably, the USC researchers did not
ask street dwellers whether they might prefer an apartment, or perhaps a
room in a fraternity or dormitory at the University of Southern Califor-
nia, to either the street camp or the city's "deluxe" outdoor alternative.
Not surprisingly, the researchers reported back to the City's planning
authorities that there was great support among homeless people for the
"camp/park" concept.
I currently advise another study, commissioned by the Los Angeles
Coalition to End Homelessness (the "Coalition").' 6 This study relies on
more open-ended interviews with a sample of people in the street camps,
so that their voices might be translated more directly and in terms
beyond the predefined vocabulary and choices presented by the Rede-
velopment Agency and the USC researchers. Just beneath the surface of
both the USC study and this one is a question: Why are these people
living on the street? The unspoken assumption of the USC study-that
they live on the sidewalks as a matter of personal preference-resulted
in the recommendation to present a slightly more attractive choice: the
"park/camps." The Coalition study makes fewer assumptions. The
interviews are not yet complete, so I cannot offer either statistics or indi-
vidual narratives. Over the years, however, I have talked with hundreds
campground one afternoon. The survivors spoke, through tears, both of the differences and of the
similarities: not only the high steel fence, but also the concentration of minority people and the
seeming indifference of the majority community.
14. Tina Daunt & Tina Nguyen, Homeless Camp Weighed in L.A. Industrial Area, L.A.
Ti~Ms, Oct. 14, 1994, at Al.
15. Jennifer Wolch & Michael Dear, Views from the Street: Interviews with Street Dwellers
(Jul. 17, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). By sheer force of the existence of
perhaps 15,000 homeless people in the Skid Row area of Los Angeles and the exhaustion of the
police, the street camps have quietly returned in large numbers. Rich Connell, A Night in the
Floating Cities of the Streets, L.A. TiMEs, June 4, 1994, at Al.
16. In addition to being an advisor, I also serve on the Board of Directors of this nonprofit
organization.
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of homeless people, including people in sidewalk encampments. For
purposes of this Essay, I have constructed the following conversation. It
is a pastiche, a construction made of remembered fragments of many
different conversations, and not a transcript. I believe that it accurately
represents what I have heard and understood in conversations with many
different people living in the street encampments of Los Angeles.1 7
Theory on the Concrete: A Constructed Interview
Q: Why are you here?
A: You mean, this piece of sidewalk? I was over there, by the fish
market, but they sprayed my stuff with water.
Q: No, I mean, why are you living in this kind of a place?
A: Well, I've thought a lot about that. There are lots of reasons.
Easiest one is: I got no job, I got no money, and I never found a land-
lord that would let me slide forever.
Q: Why aren't you on GR [General Assistance]?
A: I was. I got cut off so many times I gave it up. By the time you
spend all that time standing in lines, doing your work project, getting
screwed by your worker over some paper, you don't get enough to pay
the rent anyway. Better to scuffle out here, collect cans and what not.
Q: Why don't you use the shelters or missions?
A: Sometimes I do. But here nobody makes me pretend to pray to
eat, there are no guards trying to prove their manhood, and I have some
friends and this dog.
Q: Do you drink?
A: Sure. Don't you?
Q: Some.
A: If you lived here, you would drink more, if you could get it.
Q: How did you get along when you did have a place?
A: I was on GR some, but mostly I worked.
Q: At what?
A: Last job was unloading trucks. Best job was at the Murphy
plant, running a forklift.
Q: What happened to that job?
17. Between 1983 and 1991, all of my professional life and most of my personal political
work involved representing and working with people who were homeless. I claim no objectivity
as to what I heard or what I remember. Most of the people I have known in the camps were either
African-American or Latino men. My mental image of this person is Robert, an African
American man in his 30s, whom I knew in one of the street camps in skid row. This construction
is roughly what I remember of his story, although it was-as all real stories are-much more
complicated than this. I do not claim this story is representative. For example, the trajectories of
homelessness for women are generally quite different.
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A: It went south, to Mexico, 4 years ago.
Q: What about GR?
A: Well, the reason I can't stay on GR is they got it fixed so
nobody can stay on GR. There are a million things you got to do, and
one little screw-up and you are off. Even if it's them that screws up, a
paper gets lost or something. I think they planned it that way. If every
person out here got on GR, they each wouldn't get much, but there are
so many of them it would cost the County a fortune. So they got a little
system that is doing pretty much what they want it to do: keeping a lot
of people off GR and on the street.
Q: Did you get help from Legal Aid?
A: Yeah. I went to them a couple of times. They will call the
welfare workers for you. Once they got me back on. But then I just got
cut off again. And when I go there, it's like being at the welfare office
all over again: a long time in the waiting room and then they got no
time to hear your whole story or anything. They are off on their own
trip.
III. THREE OF MANY THEORIES: EXPLAINING HOMELESSNESS
It is no insight that "theory" is an elusive and ill-defined notion,
representing many different things in many different disciplines and dis-
courses. In their recent writing, some clinical legal scholars have
adopted the definition of Mark Spiegel: "By 'theory' we commonly
mean a set of general propositions used as an explanation. Theory has to
be sufficiently abstract to be relevant to more than just particularized
situations. ' 18 As so defined, theory is obviously not the exclusive
domain of theoreticians;, it is easy to agree with Gerald P. L6pez that
everyone is a theoretician.19 Certainly, our homeless interviewee has a
number of theories, although he did not expound them in a form familiar
to any academic discipline. If he had, they might have included the
following:
A. Marxism and the Mobility of Capital
This person is homeless because he lost his job. Whatever the
Murphy company manufactures, apparently it can be manufactured in
18. Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education,
34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 580 (1987) citation omitted; see also Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut
Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 722
n.26 (1992) Barbara L. Bezdek, "Legal Theory and Practice" Development at the University of
Maryland: One Teacher's Experience in Programmatic Context, 42 WASH. U. J. OF URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 127, 136 (1992).
19. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 65-69 (1992).
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Mexico more cheaply. So long as the costs of transportation of raw
materials and goods are not excessive, and the international financial
markets and trade agreements permit, capital will flow to those areas of
the world where labor is cheapest.20 As market imperfections like labor
unions disappear, people in the United States who have only comparable
skills to sell will lose in the increasingly direct competition with workers
in Mexico or elsewhere.21 In industries where the costs of transportation
are less, the competition is greater. As wage rates become more interna-
tionalized, workers in Mexico or Malaysia may be able to afford better
housing, but some workers in the traditionally high-wage countries will
be unable to afford any kind of stable housing. We expect these
processes to persist because they serve the interests of the social and
economic classes that have the most power in the relevant countries.
Through state action, those in power will preserve the features of these
economic arrangements that benefit them. These phenomena affect all
industries and economic sectors to varying degrees. 2
B. Social Science: Bureaucratic Disentitlement
This person is homeless because he is not receiving welfare. As the
number of unemployed and homeless people rises, the social welfare
institutions that evolved in easier times, or to mollify a once more rest-
less populace, become overwhelmed by the increased demand and
resources diminished by the recession, decreased tax collections, and the
artifacts of Reaganism: immense government deficits and a crippled
public finance system.23 In response, state and local governments may
20. For a Marxian analysis of the expected consequences of NAFTA, see Arthur MacEwan,
Globalization and Stagnation; impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 45
MONTHLY REv. 1 (1994).
21. Id.
22. The evidence is close at hand: The computer on which this Essay is being written
contains chips manufactured in Malaysia, El Salvador, and the Philippines. Only the central
processor chip comes from the now depressed Silicon Valley in California. Some of the
information used in the preparation of this essay from WESTLAW and LEXIS/NEXIS was likely
keypunched in Hong Kong or the Philippines; the remainder not already in machine readable form
was translated to computer readable form by optical character recognition programs on still other
computers. WESTLAW has moved its keypunching operations around the world in search of
cheaper labor. Skilled data entry services can be purchased very cheaply in the Phillipines,
Jamaica, or India. Offshore Data Entry Becoming Popular, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, March
29, 1993. These phenomena are not restricted to jobs requiring lesser skills: American software
companies now employ programmers in India, China and Russia at wages far below those paid
programmers in the United States. See John Eckhouse, Turning to Foreign Engineers: European
Computer Programmers Do the Same Work for Less, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1992, at BI.
23. The systems of financing social expenditures in the United States underwent dramatic
change at all levels of government. The "tax revolt" that spread from California across the
country beginning in 1978 cut dramatically into the revenues available to local governments.
Michael deCourcy Hinds, Cash Crisis Forces Localities in U.S. to Slash Services, N.Y. TIMES,
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cut directly and deeply into the fabric of the already tattered social safety
net, disentitling substantial subgroups or eliminating entire programs.
When such direct methods are thwarted, government resorts to "bureau-
cratic disentitlement"--relatively obscure and often informal changes in
procedural rules and processing systems that effectively exclude large
numbers of people.24 Although these changes are often carefully
planned, to welfare recipients they appear as irrational, arbitrary, and
increasingly burdensome requirements, and seemingly random termina-
tions of their means to survive.
C. Silenced Narrative: One Postmodern Turn
There are many possible readings of this narrative, one of which is
that this person is homeless partly because Legal Aid lawyers did not
help him, empower him or even hear him. The global economic forces
and social processes previously described increase the stress on the local
legal services office, making it even harder to deal with existing
problems. The voices of clients disappear or are distorted in the chasms
that separate professional from "client" and that separate people of dif-
ferent classes, races, genders, sexual orientations, and life experiences.
No one listens to or hears the stories of desperately poor people. As a
result, already powerless people become further disempowered. More-
over, the insights and understandings poor people have of their own situ-
ations are ignored. Possibilities for individual and collective action
rooted in those understandings are effectively suppressed. This home-
less person is trapped by both circumstance and the real violence of the
streets. The possibility of his resistance is impaired by the metaphoric
violence done to his narrative by lawyers.
IV. How THESE THEORIES MIGHT HAVE CONSEQUENCES
These three theories, implicit in and evoked by the reconstructed
interview, are, obviously a limited subset of the possible interpretations.
Other possibilities include: the social construction and functions of wel-
fare, including the play of gender and race in welfare; the consequences
of land economics in urban centers for the housing costs for the very
poor; the consequences of the still highly segregated educational system;
and the insurmountable limitations of social science and street comer
June 3, 1991, at 1; Scott J. Paltrow, Cries for Help Go Unheeded, L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at Al.
At the federal level, the national government borrowed approximately one trillion dollars to
finance tax cuts to the very rich. Robert S. McIntyre, Borrow 'n' squander: the Reagan legacy,
NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 1991, at 11.
24. See generally Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs,
58 Soc. SERV. REv. 3 (1984) (coining the phrase "Bureaucratic Disentitlement").
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interviews. Further, apart from the structural context, the individual
biography of any real person always consists of a tangled and ultimately
indecipherable web of tragedy, accident, charm, evil, misplaced desire,
and violated trust, as well as hope, love, joy, friendship, and luck.
Everything we think we know about people, history, power, and poli-
tics-indeed, everything we know or think we know-has some rele-
vance and explanatory power for the situation of any given person.
The three limited examples I have given will, however, suffice for
this discussion. Each of them meets Spiegel's metatheoretical criteria;
each generalizes beyond the context of this particular street corner to
thousands of other street corners. Each offers an explanation and an
implicit answer to a more general question: Why are there so many
homeless people in the United States? Each of them is "true" in the
sense that the explanations each provides are coherent and consistent
with a significant body of data. While none of these theories offers a
completely "true" explanation, it is not entirely false to say that this
person is homeless because: (1) he is less mobile than the capital that
made his wage labor possible; (2) the local version of the welfare state
has implemented a plan of bureaucratic disentitlement, of which he is
one of many victims; and (3) his voice was effectively silenced by those
who might have helped him to be one of the few who escape the broader
forces described by the other theories. A more difficult question than
whether these theories are true is whether and how they might have
consequences.
As a general proposition, for any discrete set of phenomena, there
may be an indefinitely large number of explanatory theories, answers to
questions in the form, "Why is X?" The range is narrowed, however, by
considering a simple antecedent question: "Why do we want to know?",
or more precisely, "What use might we, or anyone, make of the
answer?" Consider the contexts in which our sample theories either
have been or might be used.
The "mobility of capital" theory might be used in polemics for the
solidarity of international labor, in quiet discussions about the ramifica-
tions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or in aca-
demic discourse about the long-term prospects for homelessness in the
United States. This theory might inform coherent action on a truly
global scale, if an international labor movement existed. As it is, the
theory is certainly worth including in discussions in American labor
unions and elsewhere about NAFTA. Such discussions might eventually
affect policy in ways that would reduce the number of people whose
jobs "go south." If this theory has consequences, it is by providing a
construct that makes intelligible what would otherwise seem random,
1072 [Vol. 48:1063
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unrelated phenomena. Further, by naming the phenomena it purports to
describe, the theory enables conversation and common understanding. If
enough people understand what is happening to them, their families and
their friends in these terms, they might be inclined to act in ways that are
congruent, even if not entirely cohesive. What actions they might be
able to take in light of this theory would depend on those opportunities
for action that exist or can be created. A person concerned with home-
lessness might call his Senator, whereas the limited act of signing a peti-
tion requires that someone else circulate one. In short, the consequences
any theory has are highly contextual, dependent upon the array of social
and political forces confronting those who understand the theory.
The second sample theory, the social science theory of "bureau-
cratic disentitlement," illustrates the point in the context of at least one
sustained effort by poverty lawyers. As understood and applied to the
General Relief program in Los Angeles County, California, this theory
helped guide litigation in seven related cases over a period of seven
years. This litigation resulted in increased general assistance caseloads
and benefits worth more than a half billion dollars.26 It successfully
predicted the reactions of the Los Angeles bureaucracy and political
structure to litigation and organizing efforts and thereby allowed poverty
lawyers to anticipate those reactions. It helped litigators and their clients
avoid some strategies they would not have otherwise understood as
doomed to failure. It was part of a larger set of systems-theoretic
approaches that enabled for advocates to construct computer models that
predicted with high accuracy the consequences of procedural changes.
It ultimately provided a means of explaining to the press, the public and
judges what was really going on in an otherwise indecipherable and cha-
otic mess. Finally, it explained how temporary courtroom victories can
be slowly buried under the accretion of new disentitlement devices. In
any event, the consequences of this theory were significant, concrete,
and even measurable in dollars. These consequences were also contin-
gent on context: the existence of a coalition of civil rights and poverty
law organizations willing to devote substantial resources to a lengthy
litigation effort, a political context that made it possible to secure nearly
25. These cases included the following cases in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
California: Robinson v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, No. C655274; Rensch v. L.A. County
Bd. of Supervisors, No. C595155; Paris v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, No. C5623361; Blair
v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, No. C568184; Ross v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, No.
C501603; Eisenheim v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, No. C479453; Mendly v. L.A. County
Bd. of Supervisors, No. BC017558.
26. The first phase of this litigation is described in Gary L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for
Addressing Bureaucratic Disentitlement, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 591, 596 (1987-88).
I served as lead counsel and coordinator of lawyers from six public interest law firms and several
private law finns in this litigation.
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a million dollars for litigation costs, and the existence of appellate cases
giving new and more precise meanings to ancient statutes.
It may be, however, that not all theory is as dependent on material
contexts for its consequences. Consider the insights of the critical,
postmodern scholarship. By deconstructing and destabilizing settled but
often misplaced understandings of power, practice, and subjectivity,
postmodern scholarship has the potential for altering the sense individ-
ual people make of their practice, and for suggesting new modes of com-
munication and the possibilities of alliance and dialogue between poor
people and poverty lawyers.27 Certainly, the consequences that flow
from these insights are not contingent upon the existence of political
movements or litigation resources; they can operate at the level of a
single lawyer, client, or person.28 No mass movement is required, not
even a litigation fund. This scholarship can be appropriated into a single
interview, a beginning dialog between lawyer-person and client-person.
All that is required is comprehension of the theory, although this is no
small contingency.29
V. CONCRETE, CONSEQUENCES, CONTINGENCIES, AND CONTEXT
Enough about what consequences there might be. Let us return to
the perspective from the cold concrete of the Los Angeles sidewalk.
What has each of these theories to offer in the very real context of what
27. A representative sampling of such works would include the following: Lucie White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in
the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstuctive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 343 (1990); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. Rv. 1298 (1992).
28. Indeed, with the exception of the article by Jerry Lrpez, each of the articles in the
previous footnote takes as universally paradigmatic the interation between a single lawyer and a
single client.
29. The import of this discourse is often buried in a prose that seems to value most highly
subtlety, nuance, suggestion, gesture, and indirect references to other, even more obscure works.
Like much of legal scholarship, it seems mainly designed to impress other scholars with those
qualities tenure committees and established scholars are thought to hold dear. That tendency is
amplified in this particular genre by the inaccessibility of the work of those giants of postmodem
thought upon which it draws. To all but the truly initiated (a status to which I do not pretend),
some of these streams of discourse seem hopelessly muddy and opaque. Indeed, only my great
respect for the intelligence of colleagues with other views restrains my instincts, which are to go
beyond the "muddy" metaphor to embrace the double entendre of the nameless philosopher who
described Derrida as "the sort of philosopher who gives bullshit a bad name." John R. Searle, The
Word Turned Upside Down, N.Y. Rev., at 74, 78 n.3, (Oct. 27, 1983) (book review) quoted in
Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
Rav. 871, 872 (1989).
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to do about the impending creation of city-sponsored "safe zones" or
campgrounds as an alternative to the street camps?
A. Capital Movement and the Wage Markets
We must first ask what use we can make of the more global theory
of capital movement and the equalization of wage rates. For one thing,
if we believe that this is a fundamental and long-term phenomenon, then
it seems likely that the pressures producing the street camps will exist
for a long time. We therefore expect that the economic recovery antici-
pated in 1995 will not reach the bottom of the labor market. Given a
competition effectively unchecked by labor organizations or political
intervention, the equilibrium wage rate for unskilled labor across the
relevant labor markets will be so low that even more people in the
United States will be essentially destitute. Such knowledge can help
inform long-term strategic decisions. For example, our fear of modern
concentration camps would be reduced if we thought an economic
recovery would absorb most of the present population of homeless peo-
ple. Our prototype might be the temporary Hoovervilles of the Great
Depression rather than the more sinister (and likely permanent) alterna-
tives. If we believe that mass homelessness is likely to exist for a long
time, we may stiffen our resolve to prevent "pilot" park/camps that may
be steps down a more disastrous path.
B. Social Science Models of Bureaucracy
Next, we must inquire about the "bureaucratic disentitlement" the-
ory. It may be worth explaining a bit more about the litigation I referred
to above. Between 1983 and 1991, this litigation 30 sought to remove
both the particular disentitlement devices 31 then existing and to enjoin
the practice of bureaucratic disentitlement itself. We settled the last
piece of this litigation on the eve of trial with a new, liberal majority of
the governing body, the Board of Supervisors. 32 Given the legal uncer-
30. The consolidated case was known as City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles. No.
C655274 (L.A. Super, CT. filed July 22, 1987). I served as lead counsel for the co-plaintiff class
of indigent persons in Los Angeles County.
31. For example, approximately 5,000 people per month were rendered homeless each month
when they were terminated from General Relief and prohibited from reapplying for 60 days, as
punishment for an infraction of one of many rules of the program. The regulations regarding the
"60 day sanction" are contained in the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services,
GEN.ERAL RELIEF MANUAL OF REGULATIONS, Section 42-690 (1988).
32. The majority was "new" as the result of a redistricting ordered in a Voting Rights Act
case in which some of the same lawyers were involved. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756
F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). The Garza decision lead to the
replacement of an older white, male Reaganite Republican supervisor, Peter F. Schabarwm, by a
young, liberal Latina supervisor, Gloria Molina. This changed the balance of power on the 5-
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tainties and the new political reality, the plaintiffs agreed to a settlement
that removed the significant disentitlement devices then existing, but did
not enjoin the future practice of "bureaucratic disentitlement" itself.
33
In the short run, the consequences were dramatic: with the disenti-
tlement mechanisms disabled, the caseload exploded from about 50,000
to over 77,000 people in the space of a few months. 34 In response, and
under the pressure of the declining California economy and budget, the
"liberal" Board directed its lobbyists to sponsor legislation that would
undo aspects of the consent decrees, and directed its bureaucrats to
explore yet new ways to increase denials and terminations from General
Relief.35 If the current trends continue, unchecked by other litigation or
political pressure, it seems likely that about 50,000 of the present GR
recipients will return to the streets, swelling the street camps
dramatically.36
Of what use, then, is the "bureaucratic disentitlement" theory? It
facilitated legal work that had some obvious utility for a substantial
period of time to the 50,000 people who would not otherwise have
received the means of a bare subsistence.37 Now, it only helps explain
what the government is doing.38 It provides no clear guide for action,
however, unless another iteration of the same kind of litigation is legally
and practically possible.3 9 At the least, the theory helps advocates and
member Board, from very conservative to somewhat liberal. Richard Simon, Molina Wins
Historic Contest for Supervisor, L.A.Tim s, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al.
33. Robinson v. County of Los Angeles, No. C655274 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 24, 1991)
(stipulation and agreement in settlement of class action).
34. Hector Tobar, Welfare Rolls Reach Record Level, L.A. TIMES, March 3, 1992 at A3.
35. For example, the county introduced a mandatory "drug treatment" program. If a county
doctor determined that a GR recipient had "a drug problem," General Relief would be denied
unless the applicant agreed to spend three months in a locked-down in-patient "treatment" facility
90 miles from Los Angeles. As the county hoped, many people refused to surrender their freedom
for $293 per month, and thus were denied benefits. Somini Sengupta, Drug Rehab Required of
Some Aid Recipients, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at B 1.
36. Ted Rohrlich, Cuts May Double Homelessness, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993,
at B1.
37. It is, of course, not possible to determine precisely the net efects of institutional reform
litigation - even in purely financial terms - both because the effects are complex and because it
is difficult to estimate what would have happened "but for" the litigation. If, however, one takes
the time-series data thereafter, it is possible to roughly approximate the number of people who
actually benefitted from the litigation (here, about 50,000).
38. Viewed without the aid of any explanatory theory, administrative actions may appear only
to reflect common prejudice (e.g., against substance abusers) or simple bureaucratic incompetence
(e.g., mailing notices to homeless people at non-existent addresses). Viewed through the lens of
the "bureacratic disentitlement" schema, however, seeming incompetence comes into focus as
shrewd manipulation, apparent irrational prejudice is now seen as cold instrumentalism.
39. One of the constants of modem legal life is that it is easier for bureaucrats to promulgate
regulations than it is for lawyers to challenge them. Changes in procedures that may take an
administrator 10 hours to draft and promulgate may ultimately require 1,000 hours of lawyer time
to challenge. Fee shifting statutes may ultimately help redress the imbalance, but fees and costs
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homeless people- understand the underlying meaning of changes in the
currently proposed General Relief rules. It also provides a cautionary
tale about how difficult it is to permanently disassemble the mechanisms
of disentitlement. This theory tells advocates that, absent more funda-
mental political changes than the shift from a "conservative" to a "lib-
eral" majority on the county board of supervisors, General Relief will
continue to be effectively unavailable to many thousands of destitute
people. The pressures building for the "park/camps" that come from the
visible presence of thousands of people on the streets will not be less-
ened by virtue of the existence of the general assistance laws.
C. Postmodern Critical Theory
Finally, we must examine the insights of postmodern critical the-
ory. On one level, it is oxymoronic to talk of postmodern theory:
postmoderns reject theory.40 The only genuine rejection of theory, how-
ever, is silence. Different people will attach different meanings to
postmodern scholarship. What follows is but one of the many possible
interpretations.
Homelessness may actually be evidence of personal resistance, a
microrevolution that denies mission preachers and shelter guards their
power. Notwithstanding the violence of the streets, at least on the side-
walks, one need not surrender autonomy or dignity at the shelter door
along with one's pocket knife. This homeless person may have nothing
but the sidewalk beneath the cardboard upon which he sleeps, but at
least it is he who decides (until the police come along) which piece of
sidewalk that is. As a consequence of our postmodern insights, perhaps
we should celebrate this microrevolutionary triumph and return to read-
ing French philosophers.
However, assuming that we have not fully completed the
postmodern turn, we can still derive some guidance about what not to
do. Because there can be no universal, fundamental, or essential stand-
point, we pay a lot of attention to who we are. We understand that no
lawyer, advocate, or other can truly speak for any single person, let
are recovered only at the end of the process (if at all). Litigators must find the human and
monetary "capital" to carry the litigation to some conclusion. In just one case, Robinson v. County
of Los Angeles, plaintiffs expended nearly one million dollars in litigation costs. They received
$990,833 in attorneys' fees at the end of the litigation. (Stipulation and Agreement in Settlement
of Taxpayer and Class Action, dated June 8, 1991). In the same case, the defendant County of
Los Angeles expended at least $4.1 million on outside counsel, in addition to the County-
employed lawyers who also worked on the case. Ronald B. Taylor, Supervisors Seek to End Legal
Fight Over Homeless Case, L.A. TIMES, April 2, 1991, at B3.
40. See PAULINE MARnE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS,
INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 77-91 (1992).
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alone for all the people in the street camps of Los Angeles. Further,
even the notion of that one person, as subject, is false. People are not
representable in any ordered sense of self or interests. People are but
eddies in the turbulent cross currents that comprise them. All questions
are contingent on assumptions that are infinitely reflexive. All answers
are evanescent, becoming false even as they are spoken, as they suppress
other questions and other answers. In less radical form, we believe that
we should listen, knowing that we never fully understand and that we
must resist imposing our projected orderings and normative sense onto
others. Perhaps we decide to join with some of the people in the camps
and, together, try to figure out what to do. This is a worthy aspiration,
but much easier said than done. The systematic interviews sponsored by
the Coalition perhaps represent an effort in this direction, albeit a dis-
tinctly limited one.
D. These Three Theories in Local Historical Context
Assuming we reject the practical paralysis that flows from the more
extreme versions of the postmodern view, the most likely outcome in
Los Angeles is as follows: Understanding the shortcomings and obsta-
cles, let us suppose that the honest preferences of some people in the
street camps can be expressed or ascertained, either through active
organization or passive response to the Coalition survey. Suppose, fur-
ther, that the people in the street camps, of all the alternatives they per-
ceive as real, prefer the government "park/camps" and want them to
come about. What ought the Coalition leadership do?
In addition to their understanding of the reasons for the likely con-
tinued presence of many tens of thousands of people on the streets of
Los Angeles, the Coalition Board's thinking is informed by their prag-
matic sense of local history and politics.4' This sense suggests to them
the likelihood of a certain scenario or script: The pressure of the local
business community to get people off the street will lead to the creation
of more and more camps in the city. The camps themselves initially will
be located in Skid Row. The limited land and the opposition of the
neighboring landowners and businesses will create great pressure to
relocate the camps, first to South Central Los Angeles, where they will
face similar, if less powerful, opposition, and then to more remote sites.
Many in the Coalition believe that these and other pressures and the
huge numbers of homeless people in Los Angeles over the long term
might eventually lead to the creation of large camps out in the desert
41. This interpretation of the Coalition Board's understanding, here as elsewhere in this
essay, comes from my personal knowledge as a member of the Board engaged in these
discussions.
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surrounding Los Angeles. There, the 1987 Urban Campground might be
reenacted in even more ominous form, with thousands of people of color
living on the dirt, behind high steel fences and armed security guards,
free to leave but with nowhere to go. Some in the street camps share the
same visions and understandings as the Coalition leaders. 42 Possibly
most do not. A collective local history and perception of local power
that is in all likelihood unknown to many people in the camps informs
the visions of the Coalition leaders.4a Given the range of disabilities and
situations, there is unlikely to be any clear and coherent voice from the
camps. In the end and despite a heightened self-critical sense, the Coali-
tion folks may decide to fight the specter of the mass camps by resisting
the proposed "pilot" park/camps, notwithstanding the outcome of the
conversation in the camps.
In practice, theories like the three examples inform these decisions,
at least in part. Equally important is the sense the Coalition leaders have
of local history, politics, and possibility. Their experience with regard to
the 1987 Urban Campground is particularly significant. Both provide
fragments of a "script" defining likely consequences of actions in Los
Angeles. Whether the "script" has predictive value is hard to say. It is
very difficult to draw conclusions by analogical reasoning from a single
example. The Coalition leaders know of the sequence of events in
Miami" and an earlier episode in Phoenix.45 However, they have made
42. Speaking of the 1987 Urban Campground, David Smith, a homeless person, was quoted
as saying: "Fences, gates and guards.... I know a concentration camp when I see one. I'm
staying right here on the street." Penelope McMillan, Urban Campground Draws Only a Few
Homeless on Opening Day, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 1987, at B1.
43. The difference in knowledge is not the product of any intellectual deficiency on the part of
homeless people, but of the fact that only a few people in the camps have had the luxury afforded
non-homeless people to attend to local politics over a period of years. Some of those who have
spent time in the camps do demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of local political dynamics.
E.g., Norman Colbert, Skid Row, 2000 A.D., HARD TIMEs, Aug./Sept. 1994, at 7 (assessing the
prospects for street camps for Los Angeles; HARD TImEs describes itself as "L.A.'s Premiere
Homeless Newspaper").
44. Judge Atkins aptly described the events leading up to the "safe zone" remedy in Pottinger
v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1553-60 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The possible consequences of
implementing such a remedy are best illustrated in Fort Lauderdale, where the "safe zone"
implemented after Pottinger has been described as follows: "[a]bout 150 people live in tents and
bedrolls crammed inches apart on the parking lot. It is one-third of an acre .... Serving those
150 people: seven portable toilets that sometimes overflow, one cold shower that breeds athlete's
foot, and a single sink." Bob LaMendola, Conditions Worsen at City Camp, Homeless Agencies
Ask Lauderdale to Close It, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTrINEL, Jan. 11, 1994, at lB.
45. The Phoenix camp, "just one part of an extensive complex that includes two indoor
shelters, a health clinic, counseling and job referral services" was a more humane version of an
official camp, though it hardly seemed like a solution: "Pitched near the desert on the ragged edge
of the city's south side, the fenced, 3-year-old camp abuts a railroad switching yard, a lumber yard
and a cemetery." Frank Clifford, A Wide-Open Alternativefor Homeless, L.A. TIMEs, March 10,
1987, at 2-1.
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no systematic study of either. They act on what knowledge is available,
knowing that inaction also has consequences.
VI. A PRAGMATIC, COGNITIVIST VIEW OF THEORY
As these examples should suggest, all theory has at least the poten-
tial for consequences, for informing practice and decision, although that
potential is highly contextualized and dependent on local opportunities
and constructions. Having developed these examples, we can now turn
to the more interesting question of how theory has consequences. My
own understanding of this question has been transformed by my recent
efforts to apply the insights of modem cognitive science to understand
how practicing lawyers learn from experience and what distinguishes
expert from novice attorneys.
4 6
The cognitive revolution in psychology and the development of an
integrated cognitive science have produced a new, naturalized way of
looking at "theory," as one of the many kinds of knowledge representa-
tions.47 From this perspective, theory occupies no privileged place
among other forms of knowledge representations, which include not
only all the conventional notions of "theory" in propositional form, but
also prototypes, "idealized cognitive models," schemas, scripts, images,
and mental models.48 Moreover, we need not rely entirely on the specu-
lations of philosophers and projections from our own limited experience.
Instead, we can read and interpret the accumulated results of hundreds of
empirical experiments that suggest how cognitive structures, including
theory, are acquired and how they affect understanding and ability to act
in context.49 In the naturalized view cognitivism takes of theory, theory
46. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995).
47. With roots not only in psychology, but also in linguistics, epistemology, artificial
intelligence, and neurobiology, cognitive science is the study of intelligence and intelligent
systems. See generally HowARD GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW SCIENCE (1985) (for an accessible
account of the early development); 3 THINKING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE (Daniel
N. Osheron et. al. eds., 1990) (for a more thorough and current summary); Herbert A. Simon &
Craig A. Kaplan, Foundations of Cognitive Science, in FOUNDATIONS OF COGNrnVE SCIENCE 1
(Michael I. Posner ed., 1989) (for a short discussion of its origins).
48. A full explanation of these terms is beyond the scope of this paper. Basically, however,
people seem to learn and store basic concepts and categories in memory by reference to
"prototypes," "metonymic models," or "idealized cognitive models". See GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 5-90 (1987). Our understanding and memory of more
complex information is mediated by "schemas" or "scripts" that embody prototypical expectations
about objects, situations, and actions. See ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS,
PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 36-68
(1977). We reason about particular situations by constructing mental models from our stored
schemas and then "running" the models in simulation. P. N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS:
TowARDS A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE, INFERENCE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 182-204 (1983).
49. Virtually all of cognitive psychology bears in some form on these questions. Readers
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of all kinds has consequences in much the same way irrespective of
form. For example, Darwin's evolutionary theory was at the outset little
more than an application of Malthus to animals, and an analogy to
domestic breeding. 0 It provided explanations without predictions.
Other theory offers the possibility of mathematical prediction,5' while
still other theory suggests little more than which of an infinite range of
possible variables are important and which can be safely ignored. 2
Not all forms of theory, however, have equal power in reframing,
understanding or conveying information. Those representations that
restructure the central analogs or models we use have the most profound
effects. In the sciences, plate tectonics, the Copernican solar system,
evolution, neural network computers, and the Watson-Crick model of
DNA molecular structure come to mind. Marx and Freud provided simi-
lar fundamental restructurings of our understanding of the human world.
Perhaps postmodern philosophers have radically restructured under-
standing as well; perhaps not. In the more mundane world of ordinary
professional practice and political knowledge (between the relatively
infrequent paradigm shifts), different cognitive phenomena are more
seeking a general sense of the focus and content of this discourse should consult any issue of the
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION, published by
the American Psychological Association. For examples of empirical work focused more precisely
on the cognitive consequences of theoretical knowledge, see Pamela T. Hardiman, et al., The
Relation Between Problem Categorization and Problem Solving Among Experts and Novices, 17
MEMORY AND COGNITION 627 (1989) (examining effects of various levels of knowledge of theory
in physics); and Yuichiro Anzai, Learning and the Use of Representations for Physics Experts, in
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE, 64-92 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith, eds.,
1991) (same subject). As Steven Winter points out in his contibution to this symposium, he has
made extensive use of the cognitive paradigm in his own works, albeit (as I read them) in the more
limited realms ofjurisprudence and doctrinal analysis. E.g., Steven L. Winter, Legal Storytelling:
The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2225 (1989); Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
50. CHARLES DARWIN, THE OIGIN OF SPECIES AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 428-30, 900
(Modem Library 1936).
51. Mathematically predictive theories are best known in the physical sciences. We have
grown so accustomed to the power of classical mechanics, for example, that we no longer marvel
that from a few faint spots on photographic plates, we can predict the precise time and location of
the arrival of comet fragments on Jupiter many months in advance. J. Kelly Beatty, Awaiting the
Crash; Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 predicted to collide with Jupiter on July 1994, SKY &
TELESCOPE, Jan. 1994, at 40.
52. This is, of course, to use the notion of "theory" in its broadest possible sense, as entailing
only a sense of "what matters." In a noisy and chaotic world, however, this is the necessary
predicate to the ability even to notice covariation between different aspects of the environment, or
to perceive what constitutes an "aspect." In some sense, the underlying tension between the
stylized extremes of formalism and realism in jurisprudence reflects principally the tension
between beliefs about the salience of abstract rules in predicting the behavior of judges, i.e., the
extent to which "law matters," as compared to the extent to which "politics matters." Of course,
to notice that some theories begin at this level does not imply that they end here. See, e.g.,
CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993).
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typically at work. We acquire the knowledge essential to intelligent
decisions not so often by revolutionary restructurings of basic meta-
phors, analogs and models as through experience from which the
schemas that capture the similarities are induced. Individual expertise
has been explained in these terms:
[E]xperts know a large variety of problem schemas, where a
problem schema consists of information about the class of problems
the schema applies to and information about their solutions. Problem
schemas have two main parts: one for describing problems and the
other for describing solutions. ... Routine problem solving consists
of three processes: selecting a schema, adapting (instantiating) it to
the problem, and executing its solution procedure. 3
Even experts, however, do not acquire expertise through unguided
induction from repeated direct experiences. People, including experts,
extract schemas by analogical reasoning from repeated examples. How-
ever, experiments demonstrate they do so much more quickly and accu-
rately if they are supplied with an explanation of the principle
involved-essentially "naming" the schema implicit in the exemplars.54
These explanations probably come closest to what we mean by "theory"
in everyday life.
Whatever form "theory" takes, its consequences are mediated
through the same route of human cognition. Each theory helps us to see
order and meaning in what otherwise would seem to be random and
meaningless noise. Each provides a framework that structures our
understanding of individual experience and of collective history. Each
may also lead us to see order and to expect certainty where neither is
possible. Most importantly, each permits us to speak to one another
about things that are otherwise nearly impossible to verbalize.
The three theories I have used as examples can be described, albeit
incompletely, in a common cognitivist framework. The "mobility of
capital" theory is most clearly a species of what we commonly call the-
ory: propositions, whether in prose or mathematics, that describe the
relationship between abstracted notions like "capital" and "labor."55
Whatever ontological status one wants to give these concepts, clearly
they and the theory in which they are embedded capture something of
the what and why a plant owner closes a factory in Los Angeles and
moves it to Mexico. They also facilitate prediction: absent non-market
interventions, wage rates will continue to move toward an international
53. Kurt VanLehn, Problem Solving and Cognitive Skill Acquisition, in FOUNDATIONS OF
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 521, 545-46 (Michael I. Posner, ed. 1989).
54. Id. at 26.
55. See, e.g., KARL MARX, WAGE-LABOR ANDO CAPITAL 33-34 (Harriet E. Lothrop trans.
1902).
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equilibrium and manufacturing wages in the U.S. will therefore continue
to fall.
56
"Bureaucratic disentitlement" is a bit more complex. In one sense,
it describes a phenomenon of which we can make sense only if we have
a certain kind of mental model of bureaucracy as a system, with a defin-
able structure and active, hierarchical decision-making processes. In a
sense, we understand the bureaucracy in the same manner its managers
do, as a "system" in which the flow of money and people can be regu-
lated. In another sense, it represents, at a summary level, the schemas or
scripts we have of prototypical interactions between poor people and
"street level bureaucrats," except that we now understand that there is
often some uniformity, consistency and method to the Kafkaesque mad-
ness of the welfare offices.
Sometimes, we can also partially reframe the content of
postmodern theories in cognitivist terms. Both lawyer and client struc-
ture their perceptions through the scripts each has for the other and for
their interaction. Each relies on prototypes or metonymic models in
ways that both conceal and supply information. How postmodern theory
itself operates on a cognitive level is personal, contingent, and more dif-
ficult to describe in cognitive terms. Perhaps the most common con-
structs come in the form of image and metaphor, poetic exemplars after
which we might construct our own images of the subtle and complex:
Their intellectual maps were geometric and symmetrical, and covered
the entire social world, as we then imagined it. Although there was a
lot of movement within their paradigms, that movement resembled a
military drill more than a dance .... [Power is] like an evanescent
fluid, it takes unpredictable shapes as it flows into the most subtle
spaces in our interpersonal world .... Sometimes we may think we
see more or less familiar human actors, who seem to guide the fluid,
like children might make giant soap bubbles in a park. Yet at other
moments, these familiar 'persons' disappear, and we see only the pat-
terns that linger as the bubbles dance.57
A consistent postmodernist resists the temptation of theory with preten-
sions beyond the metaphoric and evocative.
From the cognitivist perspective, the form "theory" takes-whether
analogy, sets of related schemas, models, or sets of explicit proposi-
56. At least this is the prediction of the Marxist theory. For a recent example, see MacEwan,
supra note 20, at 18. A more nuanced and empirically rooted account can be found in BENErr
HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE POWER IN THE AGE OF
FLEXIBILITY (1994).
57. Lucie E. White, Seeking ... The Faces of Otherness. ..": A Response to Professors
Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn," 77 CORNELL L. Rv. 1499, 1499-1501 (1992). The first part of the
quote refers to 1960s structuralist "gurus" Noam Chomsky and Claude Levi-Strauss. The second
part of the quote characterizes Foucault's meta-theory of power.
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tions-does not matter. Similarly, it does not matter whether theory
meets some standard of epistemology or syntactic metatheory. What
does matter is how people appropriate theory into their own cognitive
structures and how they make use of it. Cognitivism recognizes that the
potential utility of all representations depends merely on whether the
models we make of them simulate what eventually happens. We thus
move beyond the sterile debates of metatheory to the question of
whether and how theory helps human beings make sense of the world.
Cognitive science also situates theory pragmatically, in relation to
problem-solving. Indeed, cognitive science understands theory only in
relation to problem-solving. This sense of theory has migrated to
occupy an important place in the most sustained metatheoretical dis-
course, the philosophy of science. Cognitivist and pragmatist currents
have infected and transformed the philosophy of science, replacing the
once hopelessly formalistic, semantic conception of theory. 59 We now
understand that scientific explanation is always situated: "explanation is
essentially relative, for an explanation is an answer '60 and intelligible
only in relation to the question and the context. A quintessentially mod-
em philosophy of science has been reconceived in quasi-postmodern
terms.
Moreover, scientific explanation arises in relation to solving genu-
ine problems. Thus, the two principal theses of one of the leading works
in this current in the philosophy of science are that: "[T]he first and
essential acid test for any theory is whether it provides acceptable
answers to interesting questions: whether, in other words, it provides
satisfactory solutions to important problems,' 6' and that "[i]n appraising
the merits of theories, it is more important to ask whether they constitute
adequate solutions to significant problems than it is to ask whether they
are 'true', 'corroborated','well-confirmed' or otherwise justifiable
within the framework of contemporary epistemology. ' 62 These would
not be bad beginnings for a coherent, pragmatic metatheory of law and
58. See, generally e.g. JOHN H. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE,
LEARNING, AND DISCOVERY (1986) (for a current example of the basic information processing
paradigm); ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING, (1972) (the
original explication of the paradigm).
59. It is worth noting that influence has flowed in both directions. Thomas Kuhn's
paradigmatic "paradigm shift" was an important notion in the early formulation of cognitive
science. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d. ed.
1962).
60. Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Pragmatic Theory of Explanation, in THEORIES OF
EXPLANATION 136, 153 (Joseph C. Pitt ed., 1988).
61. LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARD A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC
GROWTH 13 (1977).
62. Id. at 14.
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lawyering. The "cognitive sociology of science" Larry Laudan began63
is worth considering as a model, not because of any substantive "physics
envy," but rather because academic science has been relatively success-
ful as a socially constructed enterprise. Real problems get solved,
knowledge accumulates, collaboration-among both academic col-
leagues and practitioners-is common, and things get done. It might
also offer a reasonably neutral and unthreatening way of examining how
we engage in the practice of making theory.
VII. RECONSTRUCTING POVERTY LAW THEORY
In an article that was important in legitimizing the postmodern turn
in legal scholarship in poverty law circles, Anthony Alfieri spoke of
"reconstructing" poverty law practice. 64 Reconstruction was necessi-
tated by a deconstructivist analysis revealing:
[A] sociolegal world of lawyer/client discourse-voices, narra-
tives, stories-that is contested. In this world, lawyer knowledge is
partial; lawyer interpretation is contingent upon multiple categories
of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orienta-
tion; and lawyer/client relations are configured by a dominant-
subordinate hierarchy of exclusion. Accordingly, the practices of
lawyering-interviewing, counseling, negotiation, litigation-appear
not as the neutral conventions of a skilled craft, but rather as unstable
interpersonal and institutional contexts for the play of lawyer power
and client resistance.65
On careful examination, it turned out that the problem facing the poor
was not only poverty, but also poverty lawyers. By subjecting the law-
yer-client nexus to intense critical scrutiny, this strain of scholarship has
sparked (at least in the legal academy) a new level of interest in poverty
law and lawyering for and with subordinated people, particularly on
questions of roles, voice, and power.66
63. Perhaps the best known continuation of work in the direction Laudan began is that of
Ronald N. Giere, in EXPLAINING SCIENCE: A CoGNrrIVE APPROACH (1988); see generally
COGNITIVE MODELS OF SCIENCE (Ronald N. Giere ed., 1992).
64. Alfieri, supra note 27. Professor Alfieri's "reconstruction" metaphor extends both to the
reconstruction by poverty lawyers of "the lawyer's narrative meanings and images of the client's
world," and of the "reconstruction of poverty law advocacy" itself. Id. at 2134, 2147.
65. The quotation is from a later work, Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1233, 1233-34 (1992).
66. One can observe the diffusion of these discussions in legal academic discourse through a
king of crude bibliometric exercise. Two of the most frequently cited articles in this region of
legal scholarship are Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing Mrs. G., supra note 27, and Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law
Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, supra note 27. Professor White's article has
been cited in 59 articles available on LEXIS (LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File, as of October
21, 1994). Professor Alfieri's article has been cited by a roughly equivalent number (61) through
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While this examination proceeded, a largely different group within
the law schools began reexamining poverty law practice, particularly
from the perspective of law school clinics. Participants in the
Interuniversity Poverty Law Consortium (the "Consortium") funded by
the Ford Foundation have carried out much of this work.67 Their effort
has been focused more on experimentation and informal dialog than on
producing more formal scholarship. Thus far the Consortium has pro-
duced reflective, descriptive pieces about efforts in particular law school
settings,68 some of which may lay the foundation for more ambitious
scholarship in the future.
Thus, scholars have produced, in the past few years, two streams
(or, perhaps, a stream and a rivulet) of research and discussion, some-
times separate and sometimes flowing together. Articles in the critical,
postmodern stance adopted by Professor Alfieri, represent one of these
streams. 69 The efforts of practicing poverty lawyers in law school clin-
ics to make some sense of their practice, in part with the insights and
language supplied by the more traditional scholars, represent the other.70
Together, this work is sometimes referred to as "the new poverty law
scholarship."7 Although it often makes the same points as some very
the same date. One can also develop a very rough sense of the relative increase in attention the
subject of poverty lawyering has received from academics in recent years. In the four years prior
to January 1, 1990, there were 79 articles in the same collection on LEXIS that contained
references to poverty law, compared to 273 articles in the four years after January 1, 1990. While
these are, admittedly, quite imprecise measures, they offer some evidence of the point.
67. Interuniversity Poverty Law Consortium, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 57 (1992).
68. Among these are the "case studies" produced out of the Interuniversity Poverty Law
Consortium, collected at 42 WASH. U. J. OF URB. & CONTEMP. LAW. 57-247 (1989), as well as
more extensive pieces like Lucie White, Representing the "Real Deal, " 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271
(1990-91).
69. Professor Alfieri has more recently described his project as developing a "method of
internal critique forged out of the contemporary movements of critical theory within the legal
academy." Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567, 2568 (1993) (citing his earlier
works, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769
(1992); Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991).
See also, Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1747 (1994) (reviewing
Gerald P. L6pez, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE (1993)).
70. The sampling of law review articles referenced supra note 66 is illustrative, though these
scholars are "traditional" in the special senses of (1) having created their own tradition within
recent legal academic discourse and (2) in applying the insights and methods of traditions within
other disciplines, particularly literary criticism.
71. E.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1099
(1994) (illustrating the current sense of this term, and helping to identify the ways in which this
scholarship is, indeed, new).
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old poverty law scholarship,72 it is "new" in energy, form, standpoint,
and intellectual parentage.
As currently constituted, however, the "new poverty law scholar-
ship" suffers from flaws that prevent it from being of much practical
consequence for poverty law practice. The critical postmodern scholar-
ship too narrowly focuses on the individual lawyer/client microworld. It
disclaims any ambition to look for structure or explanation above the
level of local narrative.73 Its limits are largely a product of its method:
only narrative matters, and any single narrative supplies all the informa-
tion we need. Never has so much theory rested on so little practice. The
total factual content of all of this scholarship consists of perhaps a dozen
remembered episodes about individual clients in the former practices of
the respective authors.74
If this critical postmodern scholarship consists of theory virtually
devoid of evidence, the new scholarship produced by clinicians is
largely evidence devoid of theory. Notably, the clinical scholarship also
consists of narratives. These stories, however, are not about individuals
but concern larger episodes and efforts in individual law school clinics
or similar settings.75 Generally, the goal is to tell "what happened" in a
72. See generally, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049
(1970) (discussing the difference in relating to poor individuals).
73. On the question of ambition, see Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New
Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 697, 698-99 (1992) and the critical commentary it
generated in the same volume. Handler argues that postmodern scholars have a view of
microliberation captured in the Ethiopian proverb, "When the great lord passes, the wise peasant
bows deeply and silently farts." Id. at 727. Handler argues that "[p]rogressive forces need
trumpets, not farts." Id. My own view is that we could put this controversy behind us by agreeing
on tubas.
74. For a sampling of articles framed around individual client stories, see White, supra note
27 (case of Mrs. G.); Alfieri, supra note 27 (case of Mrs. Celeste); Cunningham, supra note 27
(case of M. Dujon Johnson); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable
Woman Standard in Thoery and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398 (1992) (case of"Ms. Sims,"
an amalgam of several clients); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice,
43 HASTINGs L.J. 971 (1992) (case of "Mrs. Smith"); Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note
69 (case of Bertie Johnson). Of course, the the single exemplars in these scholarly articles are also
used as vehicles for explicating nonempirical claims.
75. See, e.g., the case studies from the Interuniversity Poverty Law Consortium collected in
42 WASH. U.J. OF URa. & CONTEMP. L. (1992): Jeffrey S. Lehman & Rochelle E. Lento, Law
School Support for Community-Based Economic Development in Low Income Urban
Neighborhoods, Id. at 65 (reporting on the Legal Assistance for Urban Communities Program at
the University of Michigan Law School); Gary L. Blasi, The "Homeless Seminar" at UCLA, Id.
at 85 (discussing the joint seminar of academics and advocates at the UCLA School of Law);
Deborah H. Bell, The Law Clinic as a Regional Center: Looking for Solutions to Rural Southern
Housing Problems, Id. at 101 (discussing the housing law clinic at the University of Mississippi
School of Law); Barabara L. Bedzek, "Legal Theory and Practice" Development at the
University of Maryland: One Teacher's Experience in Programmatic Context, Id. at 127
(discussing the program at the University of Maryland); Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, A Battered
Women s Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving
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project or enterprise. These accounts often do not have a "moral of the
story" or suggest how the trajectories of similar enterprises in other set-
tings have been similar or different, and why. Because it is hard to
detect from within any single effort the influence of local context and
contingencies, this scholarship has not yet progressed to analyses that
transcend local experience. Neither has anyone undertaken comparative
studies, although the raw material is being accumulated. Therefore,
neither current in the "new poverty law scholarship" has had much
noticeable consequence beyond law schools and journals. To be fair, it
is not clear that all the participating scholars ever intended that it should,
nor is it clear that there is a waiting, receptive audience of practitioners
(assuming for the moment that they are within the intended audience).
If it is to have consequences beyond the academy, "the new poverty law
scholarship" would itself require "reconstruction." I have no blueprint
for this remodeling. I can only suggest some elements that a recon-
structed poverty law scholarship might include:
A. Addressing Many Voices and Standpoints, Including Those of
Practicing Advocates
Much of the postmodern scholarship has adopted a stance critical of
virtually all poverty law practice, implicitly (and ironically) claiming a
position that is objective and superior to this practice. From this lofty
viewpoint, "[p]overty lawyers have been described as oppressors, as
domineering, as unreflective, as poor lawyers, or as unfeeling bureau-
crats."76 The critical gaze rarely falls on the mirror: it is about the prac-
tice of others. This may explain a bit of why this scholarship has had
little impact beyond law schools. Being people of ordinary character,
practitioners naturally resist critical messages as substantively and emo-
tionally threatening as those contained in the critical scholarship, espe-
cially those that attack professional identities.77 Resistance stiffens
further when practitioners perceive the critical messages as floating
Vision of Lawyering that Empowers Clients and Community, Id. at 207 (discussing the Battered
Women's Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School at Queens College); Joseph B. Tulman, The Best
Defense is a Good Offense: Incorporating Special Education Law into Delinquency
Representation in the Juvenile Law Clinic, Id. at 223 (discussing the advocacy project at the
District of Columbia School of Law).
76. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 947, 949 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
77. There may be a few people who do not mind being seen as domineering, unreflective,
unfeeling oppressors (see Paul Tremblay's characterization of scholarly caricatures, id.), but not
many of these people are legal services lawyers. The self-identity of legal services lawyers -
whether accurate or not - is more likely to be truly one of service to clients, entailing some
personal, financial, and other sacrifices, compared to either lawyers in private practice or those
who teach in law schools.
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down from the serene heights of law schools in voices that seem
haughty, hostile, distant, and distinctly uninterested in dialogue. 78 It is
an odd epistemology that effectively treats the words of one person in a
situation as essential ("client narrative"), but regards as worthless the
narrative of another person in another part of the same situation ("pov-
erty lawyer narrative"?). Postmodem scholars often adopt an imperious,
monologic stance toward practicing lawyers that mirrors the stance they
accuse those lawyers of adopting toward subordinated people. Thus,
Lucie White suggests that Professor Alfieri adopts an "imperial, impera-
tive style of doing theory" that risks "repeating within our own theories
the very 'interpretive violence' that our theories seek to move us
beyond.'79 In general, this critical scholarship sometimes devalues and
silences the voices and experiences of the human beings who are trying
to function as progressive lawyers quite as thoroughly as those lawyers
sometimes devalue and silence the voices of their clients. It ought to be
possible for postmodern scholars to avoid the monologic stance they
criticize in others.
B. Addressing Problems Beyond the Microworlds of
Lawyer/Client Interaction
At the moment, even if scholars and practitioners did engage in a
sustained, open dialogue, much in the postmodern scholarship would
probably not be relevant to the entire range of difficult issues that con-
front progressive lawyers. If lawyers concededly suffer from profes-
sional myopia, critical law professors seem to suffer from tunnel vision.
The subjects that draw sustained critical efforts rarely extend beyond the
microfeatures of individual relationships between lawyers and
subordinated people. The implicit suggestion is that the main problem
faced by poor and subordinated people is not unemployment, illness,
hunger, homelessness, degradation, or racist oppression, but rather the
"interpretive violence" done to their narratives by poverty lawyers. This
seems to me a rather astonishing locus of emphasis. I believe (but claim
no certainty) that the unfiltered and inviolate voices of the poor might be
heard to agree.
Even if we completely transformed, in the postmodern vision,
every interpersonal relationship between lawyer and client, it is difficult
78. One crude measure of the monologic quality of scholarship about poverty law is that of all
the law review articles on LEXIS, there are 288 references to articles in the central journal and
record of poverty law practice, Clearinghouse Review, as compared to 660 in the Utah Law
Review and 460 in the Oklahoma Law Review, 590 in the Kansas Law Review, and 2815 in the
UCLA Law Review.
79. Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 853, 856 (1992)
(describing Alfieri, supra note 27).
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to see how institutional racism, real (as opposed to metaphoric) violence,
hunger, homelessness, and the other incidents of subordination would
thereby somehow quietly disappear. Liberation of client from lawyer, or
both from their objectifying roles, is a limited liberation indeed. Some
of the new scholars are aware of the dangers of focusing on interper-
sonal realities to the exclusion of the institutional and other aspects of
human life.80 However, thus far, the postmodern scholarship seems lim-
ited by its methods and focus on individual, local narrative. This view
not only misses the forest for the trees but seems captivated by the acci-
dental and contingent history of single leaves. One need not wait for
any Grand Metanarrative to attend to the structures and forces that
explain the distribution and persistence of individual tragic tales. One
can also attend to the larger stories of collective resistance and commu-
nity building, successes and disasters alike. Quite a lot exists in the
space and time scale between the momentary insight or microrevolution
and some global social transformation. Communities, organizations,
movements, and lawsuits also have stories to tell, if someone will listen.
C. Seeking Evidence Beyond Individual Narratives
Stories alone are not enough, even in understanding the
microworlds of lawyer/client interaction. Cognitive science confirms
the intuitions of the new scholarship: we understand the social world
largely through stories and narrative.8' The universality of this phenom-
enon accounts in part for the attractiveness and power of much of the
scholarship: who can forget the stories of Mrs. G.82 or Mrs. Simpson? 3
But a search of this scholarship for the evidence supporting its argu-
ments reveals only a few stories about individuals. This is one of the
few discourses in which so small a sample (N=1) is accepted as more
than illustrative. Not all such scholarship is based on single micronarra-
tives. Some studies look at the patterns in large numbers of small narra-
tives.8 4 These studies avoid extrapolating from a single story, but
80. E.g., White, supra note 57, at 1505.
81. See generally SCHANK & ABELSON, supra note 48; ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY
(1990) (expressing same ideas in a more readable version).
82. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 21-32 (1990).
83. See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An
Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEw ENG. L. RIv. 731, 732-34 (1992).
84. See generally, William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (1992) (based
in part on 115 lawyer-client conferences and an equivalent number of interviews); Barbara
Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal
Process, 20 HOFsTRA L. REv. 533 (1992) (based on examination of 659 court files, 399 court
hearing observations, and 106 "exit interviews" with tenants).
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maintain the level of analysis.
One need not aspire to a comprehensive, mechanistic structuralism
to understand that social and political life is not simply a random
cacophony of individual narratives. The moving of a factory to Mexico,
for example, may produce a thousand different stories from a thousand
different standpoints, but they are neither random nor unrelated. To
ignore what causes factories to close is also to inflict violence upon the
narratives of those whose lives are thereby disrupted. People and com-
munities, through organized efforts, sometimes resist the economic
forces that close plants. Those efforts are stories, and items of evidence,
as well. Structuralist theories may not capture all that exists, but ignor-
ing structure risks missing nearly everything. Furthermore, the exclu-
sive focus on microworlds may suppress information at the only levels
at which any meaningful progress or change can be made or sustained.
D. Engaging Practice, Confronting Practical Questions, and
Solving Problems
If scholarship supplies answers, what are the questions? Let me
give an example. In my view, one of the very best examples of the new
scholarship is Barbara Bezdek's carefully documented description of
how the voices of poor, African-American women are silenced in the
Baltimore housing court, and how "tenant rights" are rendered illusory
in the grinding daily practice of one purported dispenser of due pro-
cess."5 Professor Bezdek does not base her case on the well-told tale of
a single client nor is she content with illustrating the silencing of indi-
vidual voices. Instead, she reaches broader conclusions: "Beneath the
veneer of due process and the ordered resolution of disputes, Balti-
more's rent court systematically excludes from the law's prescriptions
litigants who are members of socially subordinated groups. ' 6 Professor
Bezdek's article would provide powerful ammunition for any organized
effort in Baltimore seeking to challenge the injustices she documents.
That is a worthy result, and one that distinguishes this work from much
clever-but useless-scholarship. So what is missing?
Professor Bezdek's article provides some compelling answers. But
to what questions? She describes the underlying question as "Why are
the tenants so silent?"87 Clearly, her research provides some answers to
that question and to the broader questions of just how the Baltimore rent
court systematically deprives poor, African-American women of rights
by shutting them up and shutting them out. Professor Bezdek's
85. Bezdek, supra note 84.
86. Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 548.
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research, however, does not fully address the question of why this is so,
because it does not ask that question in the context of what might be
done with the answer. Are all housing courts exactly like this one? If
not, why not? What have poor tenants and/or poverty lawyers done
when confronted with similar horrors elsewhere? What worked, what
didn't work, and why? Housing courts have at times looked different, in
some places with politically powerful tenant movements.88 Who are
these "well-meaning"8 9 judges who staff the Baltimore Court? Where
did they come from? How did they get there? Who keeps them there?
What are their relations to landlords and the local business elite? Does it
make a difference that the local Legal Aid has "not established a regular
court-house presence?"9 How are the dynamics of denial changed
when the tenant can effectively countersue, putting the landlord at risk in
the same proceeding? 9' The outrages Professor Bezdek describes so
well are not inevitable in all their details. They are in part the product of
politics and decisions by, among others, poverty lawyers and legal aid
managers.
To repeat, Professor Bezdek's article is one of the best examples of
the new poverty law scholarship because it is both true and useful, both
for polemics about how bad things are in one place and for understand-
ing similar institutions in other places. This is no small accomplish-
ment. What is troubling is not the shortcomings of this article, but that
the new poverty law scholarship would find it the suitable end of a pro-
ject, rather than the beginning. A fully engaged, reconstructed poverty
law scholarship would also address questions of what could or should be
done about the problems it documents. In so doing, it would look not
only to the hundreds of micronarratives of individual tenants, but also to
the handful of larger narratives. What happened in other housing courts
when poor people and advocates did this or tried that, and what seemed
to be the conditions of success or failure?
88. For example, tenant organizations became a powerful political in Santa Monica,
California in the 1980's. ALAN D. HESKIN, TENANTS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1983). The
largest tenant organization, Santa Monicans for Renters' Rights, has had significant influence on
the selection of judges who hear landlord-tenant disputes. See, Julio Moran, Elections Municipal
Court, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1990, at J3.
89. Bezdek, supra note 84, at 536. Sometimes "polite" is mistaken for "well-meaning."
90. Id. at 550 n.59. I know from experience that courts at least attend more to appearances in
the presence of Legal Aid lawyers and court watchers. With Barbara Blanco, now of Loyola of
Los Angeles Law School, I created and directed the Eviction Defense Center of the Legal Aid
Foundation of Los Angeles. The Center represents more than 10,000 tenants in eviction
proceedings each year and has at least one lawyer in the housing court virtually every day.
Memorandum from the Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inc., Eviction Defense Clinic Survey
(June 30, 1994) (on file with author).
91. I am told that this approach has produced good results in some places, like Jamaica Plain,
Massachusetts.
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E. Not Giving Up Too Soon
In the realm of theory-work, the limitations of method have pro-
duced a premature failure of ambition. The fully consistent postmodern
turns from "theory" to:
[A] situated theoretical practice-to the slow learning that
comes from multiple, partial perspectives, from uncertain readings by
advocates of their own day to day work. In this view, the project of
doing theory is itself "reconstructed" into a collective practice.
Rather than a task reserved to scholars, theory becomes a habit of
ongoing conversational reflection about how to describe the
problems, make alliances, devise strategies, and thus move together
toward a better world. Theory is the ongoing practice of reflection
among the communities of poor people and their allies that are con-
stituted by the work they come together to do. This kind of theoreti-
cal practice does not yield the static artifacts, the articles and books,
that we have learned to equate with "theory." Rather, this kind of
theoretical practice is enacted in those elusive moments of insight
that mark good conversations, or in those tactical innovations that
work. This kind of theoretical practice could be "written up," finally,
only in a situated, reflective history of the practice itself.
92
This is an appealing vision on many levels. It is respectful of practice
and ordinary people. It accords with our fundamental view that there is
no fundamental view. It is also a very limited vision, one of microthe-
ory serving micropractices. It accepts only narrative, and quite limited
and local narrative at that, among all the possible representations of
knowledge. It offers no hint of how the occupants of these local
microworlds might coalesce to contest the congealed power of institu-
tions and organizations that maintain and defend subordination. The
result seems almost premodern, and in the face of the very modern
opposition, entirely defeatist. Local narratives yield only local knowl-
edge. Further, given the requisite mode of collaboration and communi-
cation, only local narrative is possible. One local struggle cannot
inform the participants in another because the lessons of local experi-
ence cannot find expression, certainly not in any totalizing, universal-
ized theory captured in "static artifacts," but ultimately not at all. In the
face of forces of exploitation and oppression that are not only informed
by coherent theories, but are "imperial and imperative" beyond the
realm of mere metaphor, the "premodern" local collaborations have as
92. White, supra note 79, at 854-55 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
93. This seems the result, even though Professor White speaks of such things as "tactical
innovations that work." Id. at 855. If restricted to collective reflection on common experience and
denied a language of more generalized constructs, concepts, causal hypotheses-theory-then
how can people in different places and times communicate and learn from each other?
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much chance of overcoming subordination as did the peasant uprisings
of the literal premodern era.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL
How might we preserve the contingent, dialogic qualities of "situ-
ated theoretic practice" without abandoning the effort to make useful
"theory" in the practical service of helping people and fighting subordi-
nation? How might we arrive at a "reconstructed poverty law scholar-
ship" that extends and unifies the two present currents?
Like theory, metatheory also needs a context. Some months ago a
dozen or so people from around the country who have worked as advo-
cates or lawyers for homeless people met in Washington for two days to
talk about our past and future work and to formulate a "training" plan
for legal services lawyers. The group had more than 200 person-years of
experience, including not only some thousands of episodes of work with
individuals each lasting a few weeks or months but also a few hundred
episodes of work with groups of people, organizations, and institutions
organizing or litigating efforts over a span of a few months or years, and
perhaps a dozen episodes on the scale of a decade or more. Only a
couple of people had direct experience with the issues of "camps" for
homeless people, but everyone had experience that was indirectly rele-
vant. Nearly everyone, for example, had been involved in advocacy
against the local criminalization of homelessness. Together, these advo-
cates began compiling their experiences and extracting common lessons.
The group did not engage in a lot of "theory-talk." Anyone who
has worked on the same general problems over the space of many years,
however, learns something about what has and has not worked, and has
induced some implicit theories about the world in which she has prac-
ticed. That knowledge may not be represented in any explicit form, and
certainly not in a "theory." Instead, it may come as implicit theories,
prototypes of situations, models of how certain things work, scripts for
how and when other things fall apart, and stories not yet understood.
For example, one can learn from experience some of the unintended
consequences of advocating for "the homeless," when the reality is
much more complex than the stereotypes these words evoke: there are
many very poor people who are without shelter some of the time, but
who are also hungry, sick, and sometimes disabled by chemical addic-
tions. One can learn the limits of fights for "rights" to shelter, rather
than fights to impose obligations to provide housing. Of course, differ-
ent people learn different things. The same approach that leads to real
progress in New Jersey may be a prescription for disaster in Illinois.
Every extracted lesson of experience is laden with conditions and con-
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tingencies that are very difficult to see from within that experience.
Moreover, the difficulty in talking about complex things, is exacerbated
when there are no names for the things one wants to talk about. Finally,
the collective experience is obviously limited. These are advocates and
not poor people; their views are inevitably colored and distorted by that
position and their own interest (much as the perspective of academics is
inevitably colored and distorted by their social position and personal
interest).
These limitations are not easy to overcome. Some seem nearly
insurmountable. For example, "homeless people" have no elected repre-
sentatives from whom poverty lawyers can easily take strategic direc-
tion.94 Leaving aside more profound problems, few opportunities exist
for practitioners to effectively share what they have come to understand
from local practice, to compare notes and sort out the contingencies.
Other forms of communication are similarly limited. Few practitioners
have the luxury of time for systematic reflection, let alone for efforts at
explicit theorizing or writing. Most of the academic writing is at a level
so general or superficial as to be largely irrelevant. Further, it generally
ignores the empirical evidence that constitutes the experiences of
thousands of poor people and poverty lawyers. Practitioners do talk
informally, but they seldom have enough time for anyone to understand
sufficiently the details of other situations and histories to have a conver-
sation of any depth. National meetings with a sustained focus, like the
Washington meeting of homeless advocates, are quite rare and not
always successful.
On occasion, as with the Washington meeting, one comes to see the
value and the unrealized potential. By comparing experiences, drawing
on both separate and common histories, and correcting for the idiosyn-
cracies of individual places and times, a dozen people are much more
astute than any one of them would be alone. Without doubt, because of
who they collectively are, distortions and blind spots remain, but are
fewer than in the local knowledge of any single advocate. For a time,
the imperfectly combined knowledge of many people constitutes a supe-
rior, if evanescent, kind of intelligence. If it remained constituted in that
form, the capacity for action, for making good decisions, and for solving
problems, would be quite remarkable. Collaboration is evanescent,
however, because people return to their separate, local practices-and
94. Advocates of the "servant of the people in dialog with the people" view of poverty
lawyering have generally ignored this problem. One could wait a very long time for homeless
mentally disabled people, or drug-exposed infants, to organize and assert their interests, in dialog
with poverty lawyers or otherwise.
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nearly all practice is ultimately local. They leave behind no record, no
"artifacts" of the insights they achieve.
Not that any artifact could capture and sustain, or replace, all the
intelligence and experience in such a gathering. But might not some of
it be preserved and made accessible? In fact, might scholarship not
serve in part as a functional substitute for these rare and limited conver-
sations? Suppose a few poverty law scholars broadened their sense of
narrative from the stories of individuals to the stories of groups, institu-
tions, and collections of lawyers, and sought to explore with them the
record and the sense they have made of their practice in working with
poor people. Suppose those same scholars broadened the inquiry still
further, to include the perspectives of poor people and others. The result
might entail some explicit propositional "theory," naming the schemas
that recur. More likely it would involve facilitating a common search
for insights in many forms, such as stories, schemas, analogs, and
mental models. The raw material for this work exists, not only in the
experiences of clinicians and law school clinics in the Poverty Law Con-
sortium, but also in the larger and richer world of legal services and
other practice settings.95 Suppose scholars added to these larger narra-
tives what systematic social science can be gathered from opinion polls,
content analysis, and the like.
This kind of scholarship might be guided by some preliminary
identification of the problem, but we would not know what level of "the-
ory" to expect: a way of modeling a bureaucracy; an insight into how
the images evoked by advocacy alter the outcome of particular kinds of
political contests; or a low-level generalization about forms of lawyer-
client interaction that maximize a felt sense of collaboration. Some-
times, scholars might be engaged in practice with both lawyer/advocates
and poor people. At other times, the role might be less involved and
more facilitative. Scholars might also just observe, or unearth the past
and decipher its order, and then communicate it back to others who can
make some use of the understanding.
Undoubtedly, more conventional scholarship, in commentary on
cases and commentary on the commentary of others, has some value.
The social context in which most legal scholars work causes them to
write mainly for other scholars, and to be as concerned with form and
95. In the U.S., there are about 600 full time teachers in law school clinics, compared to about
4,800 full time Legal Services poverty lawyers. Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational
Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS BAR 53, 247. The world external to
law school clinics is potentially much richer. In only a few law school clinical situations is it
possible to conduct lengthy, complex litigation or significant community organizing and education
efforts of the kinds one sees in actual poverty law practice.
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appearance as with content. That people whose main work consists of
talking and writing come to believe in the centrality of language, narra-
tive, and interpretation is not surprising. Moreover, these modes of anal-
ysis are, in turn, at the core of the only postgraduate training most legal
scholars have had. But to most people outside academia, however, par-
ticularly poor and subordinated people, the point of all this is likely lost.
To most people, the point is not to produce clever insights, interpreta-
tions, constructions, and reconstructions. In the end, as one young
scholar once put it, the point is not merely to interpret the world, but to
change it.
96
96. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change
it" was the eleventh of the "Theses on Feuerbach" written out by the young Marx, found years
later among his papers by Engels. 1 KARL MARx & FREDERICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY
123 (C.J. Arthur ed., 1970).
1994] 1097
